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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND THE DISABLING NEUROSIS
ALEXANDER R. MANSON*

W

ORKMEN'S Compensation is a legislative remedy which was created
in the early part of this century to ameliorate the harsh effects of the
common law. Under the common law denial of compensation was the result in a
great proportion of fatal and non-fatal industrial injuries.1 The common
law of torts required the injured workman to prove that his injury resulted
from his employer's negligence and then gave the employer the defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and fellow servant rules. These
hurdles proved almost insurmountable for the injured employee seeking
2
compensation under common law.

A statutory scheme was eventually put into law which provided
monetary payments and medical benefits for injuries which impaired the
earning capacity of the worker, when such injury arose "out of" and "in the
course of" employment.3 Except when the payments are scheduled for loss of
a particular member of the body, injuries are compensated only when they
4
result in disabilities of total or partial incapacity to perform one's work.
The two general requirements which must be met are that the employee
sustain an injury which impairs his earning ability and that this injury arise
out of and in the course of employment. Of course the particular wording of
a statute varies from state to state but the general scheme and purpose are
approximately the same. 5
Workmen's Compensation, unlike the Federal Employee's Liability Act,0
which covers railrodd workers whose employers engage in interstate commerce,
does not merely abrogate certain restrictive aspects of the common law. In
FELA cases the action is still one of common law except that the defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk and fellow servant rules are abolished. The action is still brought in a court of law and the negligence of the
employer must be proven before a recovery is had. Albeit, to get a case to the
jury in an FELA action less evidence is needed than in an ordinary negligence
action.7 In contradistinction, Workmen's Compensation completely supplanted
the common law remedy and created a whole new method for compensating
injured employees unknown to the common law. In both the procedure established and the criteria used in granting an award, the method is in conflict with
the common law.8 This point is crucial and should be borne in mind when
L.L.B., University of Buffalo, January 1962.
1. Riesenfield and Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 137 (1950).
2. Ibid.
3. 1, 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (1952).
4. Ibid.
5. Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Statutes (1939-1949).
6. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
7. 38 A.BA.J. 1011, 1059 (1952).
8. The initial award is granted by an administrative board which is not bound by the
rules of evidence or procedural limitations of the courts. 2 Larson supra note 3 at § 92,
*
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considering cases where the courts, in passing upon awards, impart tort doctrines which require certain conditions not explicitly stated in the statute;
e.g., the tort rule that there must be a physical impact to allow recovery. The
Workmen's Compensation Act should, as far as possible, be considered as a
unitary system and undue extrapolation from the common law doctrines used
to establish causal relationships might better be avoided.
The impact of old methods of analysis is hard to avoid in any area of
intellectual endeavor. It was almost inevitable that certain ways of thinking
about a tort case of negligence would creep into the new scheme of workmen's
compensation due to a general tendency of the mind to relate the familiar to
the new. The early cases under workmen's compensation exhibited the tendency
when they required that an injury could not be compensated unless it resulted
from a physical impact to the body.9 The impact rule was not rigidly adhered
to and it soon became enough if the resulting injury could be described as
physical.' 0
The requirement that there be an impact was bound up with the statutory
mandate that there be an accident which causes the injury or that the injury
be accidental." The problem of causality was more readily solved if the court
could point to a physical impact, which occurred at work, and the injury appeared in the place of impact. The courts found it somewhat more difficult to
impose the monetary burden of an injury upon the employer where the usual
industrial injury involving a physical impact was not present. An early English
case, which became a precedent for later American decisions, defined an accident
as, "an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or
designed."'12 This definition gave the courts more leeway to compensate an
injury to a worker, which was not expected, even though it did not result from
a physical impact. The lack of an impact did not detract from the unexpectedness of the injury or the fact that it was a mishap or untoward event.
It was not long before the compensation boards and the courts were confronted with compensating mental disabilities which impaired the worker's
earning capacity and arose out of the work situation. The problem centered
around what factors the courts would recognize as establishing the conclusion
that the mental disability arose out of a mishap that occurred or was the
unexpected result of the employment situation. An analysis of this aspect of
compensation law requires a brief excursion into the science of psychoanalysis
or more generally the science of mental disease.
The psychoneurosis or neurosis may be broken down into several generally
accepted classifications. They are grouped as: anxiety neurosis, hysteria or
conversion neurosis, obsessive-compulsive neurosis, and neurasthenia.
The anxiety neuroses are states of fear or panic from which the individual
9. Larson, supra note 3.
10. Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941).
11.

1 Larson, supra note 3 at § 38:80.

12. Fenton v. Tharley & Co. [1903] A.C. 443, 448.
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suffers severely, but the thing which is feared or the object of panic which gives
rise to the anxiety remains unknown to the sufferer. The anxiety remains
diffused and not focused upon any specific ideational content that is perceived
by the individual's conscious mind. This malady appears to be the most common among the types of neurotic disturbances.
The hysteria or conversion neurosis may be broken down into two classifications, episodic and conversion. Episodic hysteria is evidenced by amnesia,
somnambulism and disassociation of one aspect of a person's conscious life
from other aspects. The conversion disorder is a malady which converts the
individual's unconscious impulses, which are reprehensible to the individual's
conscious mind, into an organic disorder such as gastric ulcer, migraine, colitis,
and paralysis of a member or any part of the body. It is probably the anxiety
which the forbidden thought or impulse engenders that is converted into the
organic syndrome.
A type of neurosis exists which eludes precise classification and may partake of the symptoms of either anxiety or hysteria neuroses but is distinguished
in the manner in which it becomes externally observable. It is not in the four
types enumerated above but is considered for certain purposes a separate
entity and denominated the traumatic neurosis. Its onset is traced to a sudden
fright or small injury or accident for which the emotional and physical equipment of the individual were not prepared to react. It is considered a flooding
of the psychic apparatus with stimuli, in such great quantities, that the mind
cannot bind and bring the stimuli under manageable control. All of the individual's mental energy is concentrated upon mastering these stimuli and the
individual withdraws from other thoughts and activities until the stimuli are
brought under psychic control and a mental equilibrium is returned. The
neurosis is the result of the continuing attempt of the individual to master the
stimuli engendered by the traumatic experience. 13 Freud considers the traumatic neurosis as a manifestation of the repetition-compulsion which he defines
as a tendency inherent in all organic life to reinstate an earlier condition. The
repetition-compulsion forces an individual to go back to his traumatic experience and mentally relive it in order to bind the stimuli in accordance with the
pleasure principle. The pleasure principle is defined as a law of mental functioning which attempts to keep mental tension constant or as low as possible.
Freud then postulates a death instinct whose goal it is to return the organism
to the tensionless state of inorganic matter.' 4 The above theory, which Freud
denominated as metapsychological, is highly controversial and rejected by almost all neo-Freudians today. In any case its acceptance is not necessary for
an explanation or understanding of the traumatic neurosis.
Fenichel analyzes the traumatic neurosis thusly: "After a little traumata,
like a sudden fright or smaller accident, the person feels irritated for a certain
13. Gultmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law (1952).
14. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).
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time, cannot concentrate because inwardly he is still concerned about the event
and has no energy free for attention in other directions. He then repeats the
event in his thoughts and feelings a few times and after a short while his
mental stability is re-established. Such a little traumatic neurosis may be
explained as flooding of the organism by amounts of unmastered excitation and
as attempts at belated mastery. The severe traumatic neurosis must be looked
at from the same angle.' 15 Of course, what would be a traumatic experience to
one individual may be another's daily fare. The inherited constitution of the
individual, his early experiences and modes of reacting to them, will be determinative of whether a particular experience has a traumatic effect upon the
mental life or is assimilated with little effort. 16
A more lengthy discourse on the traumatic neurosis is necessary due to its
importance in relation to workmen's compensation claims. The majority of
workmen's compensation claims which seek compensation for a neurotic disability involve a traumatically or an alleged traumatically induced neurosis.
The source of the trauma is usually some powerful force or congery of forces,
e.g., a physical blow to the body, near escape from death, or other experiences
encountered at the employment situation.
The external symptoms of a traumatic neurosis, as opposed to internal
mechanics, are evidenced by emotional instability, restlessness, crying, and
spells of rage. Marked sleeplessness and a return to the traumatic experience
by way of dream life is a result of the tendency to relive the traumatic experience in order to gain a mastery of it. The person also works over his traumatic
experience in waking life for the same purpose. There is usually a diminution
of the sexual interest of the affected individual and complete loss of sexual
7
potency may even result.'
The neurosis which most clearly exhibits its derivation from unresolved
conflict arising from the unconscious mental life is the obsessive-compulsive
neurosis. Its salient feature is a compulsion to dwell upon a worry which has
little or no relation to the individual's actual life situation. This kind of neurotic
might be obsessed with the idea that he has cancer or is inexorably developing
a cancer when his actual health gives him no rational ground for such a belief
or expectation. This type may be compelled to perform ritualistic acts contrary
to his real desires, and in most cases bringing pain to the individual.
The motive for the ritualistic acts of the obsessive-compulsive neurotic
is most cogently explained in the language of one of the greatest creative minds
of all intellectual history, Sigmund Freud. His superlative integration of logic,
reason, epigram, and vivid imagery has no comparison in scientific writing.
The temptation to quote him at length is irresistible: ".

.

. The character of

compulsion neurotics shows a predominant trait of painful conscientiousness
15. Guttmacher and Weihofen, supra note 13.
16. Freud, supra note 14 at 44.
17. Freud, supra note 14 at 45.
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which is a symptom of reaction against the temptation which lurks in the unconscious, and which develops into the highest degrees of guilty conscience as
their illness grows worse. Indeed, one might venture the assertion that if the
origin of guilty conscience could not be discovered through compulsion neurotic
patients, there would be no prospect of ever discovering it.
"In the second place we cannot help noticing that the sense of guilt contains much of the nature of anxiety; without hesitation it may be described
as 'conscience phobia.' But fears point to unconscious sources. The psychology
of the neurosis taught us that when wish feelings undergo repression their libido
becomes transformed into anxiety. 18 In addition we must bear in mind that
the sense of guilt contains something unknown and unconscious, namely the
motivation for the rejection. The character of anxiety in the sense of guilt
corresponds to this unknown quantity."'19 Freud goes on to explain the relationship of a savage's taboos and the prohibitions and compulsions of the neurotic
as both guarding against a forbidden impulse. He postulates that taboos,
rituals and compulsions are defenses against the desire to kill. He reasons,
"For what nobody desires to do does not have to be forbidden, and certainly
whatever is forbidden must be an object of desire." 20
Freud explains the existence of the individual's desire to slay his fellow
men in the following manner: "But if we take into account the following results of psychoanalysis, our understanding of the problem is greatly advanced.
The analysis of dreams of normal individuals has shown that our temptation
to kill others is stronger and more frequent than we have suspected and that it
produces psychic effects even where it does not reveal itself to our consciousness.
And when we have learnt that the obsessive rules of certain neurotics are nothing but measures of self-reassurance and self-punishment erected against the
reinforced impulse to commit murder, we can return with fresh appreciation to
our previous hypothesis that every prohibition must conceal a desire. We can
then assume that this desire to murder actually exists and that the taboo as
well as the moral prohibition are psychologically by no means superfluous but
are, on the contrary, explained and justified through our ambivalent attitude
toward the impulse to slay." 21 Thus, it appears that the silly rituals and compulsions of the obsessive-compulsive neurotic are defenses against the anxiety
engendered by the ego's perception of a morally reprehensible wish existing in
18. Freud revised the view expressed in this sentence in a work entitled Inhibitions,
Symptoms, and Anxiety published in 1926. He discarded the theory that repression of
libidinal impulses resulted in a conversion of the repressed libido into anxiety. His new
position was that anxiety preceded repression and not vice verse and indeed was the motive
for the repression. The anxiety did not result from the transformation of repressed libido
but was the result of a perception of danger felt to be real by the ego. This is not to say
that the anxiety had to be a result of a danger that in fact existed in objective reality, but
merely that the person experiencing the anxiety perceived it as a real objective danger to
.
.
the organism. - .

19. Freud, Totem and Taboo 90-92 (1946).
20. Ibid.
21. Freud, supra note 19 at 42.
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the unconscious, the attempted fulfillment of which the ego comprehends as a
danger to it.
The courts have long held that where a physical injury has caused a disabling neurosis resulting in impairment of earning capacity that the neurosis
will be compensable 22 Among those courts which require a physical impact
there seems to be a feeling that there has not been an accident within the
language of the Workmen's Compensation Act unless a physical impact has preceded the onset of a disabling neurosis. For some strange reason which defies
exact logical articulation these same courts will allow a recovery if a physical
injury has preceded the neurosis and it is felt that the neurosis arose out of
the injury, even in the absence of physical impact. If the court can find an
impact then the impact can be defined as the accident from which the injury
arose. Courts bound by this logic often stretch a point to find an impact. They
will evolve a repeated impact theory, whereby each tiny noise, bump or jar is
regarded as an accident occurrence. Then the last noise, bump or jar which
precipitated the injury or the sum total of these will be regarded as the accident.
A recovery granted for loss of hearing due to repeated loud noises of gunfire in
a target range is a case in point.2 3 This case exhibits the tendency to grant
compensation where there is no physical impact but a distinct series of occurrences (the firing of guns), which can be defined as accidents if there is a
resulting physical injury. One -suspects that because the causal relationship
between loss of hearing and the noise of the firing is fairly clear the court is
less reluctant to abrogate the requirement of an impact. An accident is also
found where the cumulative effect of years of pressure ultimately results in a
disabling injury even though no one specific day of pressure caused the injury.24
The necessity of having a causal relationship between the disability and
some occurrence that took place at work, in the course of that work, is a partial
motive for the necessity of impact, an accident traceable to a reasonably definite
time, place and occurrence or cause,25 and the requirement that a physical
injury must result. The neurosis comes out second best in these courts because
it does not receive the benefit of the liberal construction of the accident requirement. The neurosis must be the result of an impact itself, or the result of
physical injuries, however slight. Thus, a worker who was bitten by a cat at
work and developed a neurotic fear of rabies and consequently was disabled
was allowed to recover even though his physical injury was insignificant 2 6 In
New Jersey the claimant is out of luck who cannot prove an accident by way
of a physical impact or physical injury. A claimant in that state asserted that
a co-worker called her an-"idiot" because she .misunderstood what she was to
22. Kolikoff v. Lucas, 271 App. Div. 942, 67 N.Y.S.2d 153 (3d Dept. 1947).
23. Winkle v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kari. 503, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).
24. American Maize Products Co. v. Nichiparchik, 108 Ind. App. 502, 29 N.E.2d
801 (1940).
25. 1 Larson, supra note 3 at § 37.20.

26. Kolikoff v. Lucas, supra note 22.
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do. This upset her very much and caused agitation and weakness. She was
treated later by a doctor for severe nervous agitation. The court held there
had been no accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
It stated, "I am satisfied that the petitioner did not meet with an accident arising out of and in the course of employment; in fact, there was not one iota of
testimony to even suggest an accidental occurrence. ''27 The causal relation
here appears clear, and even if claimant had a predisposition to neurotic reaction, this should not bar recovery, since an aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable 28
New York is among the minority of states that refuses to compensate a
mental disability unless a physical impact or physical injury is involved. In a
1959 case claimant hit a pedestrian by his cab and knocked him unconscious.
The pedestrian was taken to the hospital where it was found that his injuries
were merely superficial. Claimant was very upset and argued with a police
officer at the scene of the accident. He became despondent and about a month
later was admitted to the hospital with a mental breakdown. The Appellate
Division in rejecting his claim for compensation stated, "we find nothing in the
law that connotes purely excessive emotions, anger, grief or other mental feelings-unaccompanied by physical force or exertion can be the basis of an
accident. It may be logically argued that claimant here is just as disabled as
someone who suffers from a physical disability. This we do not dispute but it
does not, at present, constitute an accident as defined by the Workmen's
Compensation Law.2 9
The conservative position taken by New York and other states contrasts
quite vividly with the English practice established quite soon after the inception of its workmen's compensation law. In 1910 claimant, a coal miner all his
life, had been working at a coal face far underground when a fellow miner was
crushed by a timber. Claimant helped get his crushed fellow worker out of
the pit but he died shortly thereafter. Claimant developed a neurotic aversion
to working at the coal face. The King's Bench merely asked if the disability
was caused by what happened during the course of his fulfilling his duty to his
fellow worker and whether this resulted in his inability to carry on his duties.
It felt that since both questions were answered in the affirmative claimant was
entitled to compensation. 30 The English court was unimpressed with the argument that no previous case had granted compensation without a physical impact or physical injury causing the neurosis.
Some courts felt precluded from granting compensation for a neurotic
27. Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 791, 187 A.334 (1936).
28. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Byrd, 215 Miss. 234, 60 So. 2d 645 (1952); Sigley v.
Marathon Razor Blade Co., 111 N.J.L. 25, 166 A. 518 (1933); Smith v. Essex County Park
Commission, 15 N.J. Misc. 227, 190 A. 45 (1937). Pre-existing condition will be compensated in full if disability is precipitated by an occurrence arising out of and in the course
of employment.
29. Cherrin v. Progress Service Co., 9 A.D.2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dep't 1959).
30. Yates v. South Kirby & Co. Collieries, Ltd., (19101 2 K.B. 538.
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disability by the particular wording of the statute. Thus, a Nebraska court
denied compensation for a neurotic disability where there was no damage to
the body under a statute which defined injury to mean "violence to the physical
structure of the body."' 1 The claimant was a female elevator operator and was
on duty when a passenger was caught between the floor of the elevator and the
second floor of the building. Claimant was in the elevator for 30 minutes with
the dying man. She developed a severe and disabling neurosis as a result of
this experience. The court held that there must be an actual physical injury
to the body before any consequent mental damage can be compensated.a 2 The
court had no trouble finding an accident but felt that this was not the type of
accident which called for compensation since the injury did not conform to the
statute.
Even a statute which requires injury to the physical structure of the body
can be construed to allow recovery for a neurosis where no physical impact or
physical injuries are involved as the Texas courts have proved. In Bailey v.
American General Insurance Co.,33 claimant developed a neurotic condition
as a result of watching a fellow worker die. They were standing upon a scaffold
which collapsed and the fellow worker plunged to his death while the claimant
narrowly escaped. The court allowed a recovery even though there had been
no physical impact or injury and the statute required an impairment to the
physical structure of the body. The court felt a physical impact was not required before an accident existed under the statute and it found impairment
to the physical structure of the body when control over the body was impaired, i.e., mental control. The court rightly saw that the mind and the body
are an integrated whole and impairment of one inevitably effects the other. In
another case a young lady was frightened by a flash from a short-circuited motor
and fainted. She returned to work but later when she saw the fellow worker
who caught her the first time she fainted, she fainted again. Thereafter she
could not return to work because of a neurosis. An award of Workmen's Compensation was affirmed, the court stating, ".. . the rules of the common law of

tort actions do not apply to cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act." 34
The courts will generally allow compensation where there is a physical
impact or physical injury from which the neurosis ensued and/or where there
is a single event of a significant nature such as watching a comrade die or seeing
an electric flash, and a neurosis results therefrom. 35 In general terms then, the
claimant can recover if his neurosis can be traced to a physical injury which
arose out of and in the course of employment. He can also recover if a single
psychological event has precipitated his neurosis, i.e., if a psychological stimulus
31. Neb. R.R.S. 1943 § 48-151(4) (1952).
32. Bekeleski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 662, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
33. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
34. Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, supra note 10.
35. Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 380, 232 P.2d 975 (1951); Geltman v. Reliable
Linen and Supply Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 25 A.2d 894 (1942).
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has precipitated a psychological reaction as opposed to a physical or biological
reaction.
There is a paucity of cases in which an award has been granted where
a mental disability has arisen merely from the stresses and strains of the ordinary
day to day work. Carter v. General Motors Corp. is such a case and is sharply
distinguishable from the mental shock cases. 3 In Carter, claimant worked on
an assembly line in a job which involved no extraordinary physical or mental
strain. He had just been called back to work after a five month layoff and was
given a new job. This consisted of taking wheel assemblies off of the assembly
line, working on them and placing them back on the line. The claimant found
that he could not keep up with his job unless he took two wheel assemblies
off the line at once but when he did this he mixed the parts and his foreman
yelled at him for it. If he did not take two assemblies off at a time he fell
behind in his rate and his fellow workers grumbled because this also put them
behind in their rate. After thirteen days of working in this situation claimant
collapsed and was unable to continue working. His condition was diagnosed as
paranoid schizophrenia. He sought compensation and the expert testimony
at the hearing revealed that he suffered from an inadequate personality all his
life. His personality appeared rigid and incapable of adapting to new situations
and stresses. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed an award of compensation granted by the board in an opinion which reviewed the law of both
Michigan and other jurisdictions on the subject. The court rejected the argument that compensation cannot be granted where there is no single mental
shock or impact which can be pointed to as the cause of the mental disability.
It held that as long as competent medical experts established the causal relationship between the stresses of the job and the mental disability the board was
able to conclude that the mental disability arose out of and in the course of
employment.
It does not appear that any reported cases under workmen's compensation
have granted relief in a case of a mental disability arising out of the ordinary
stresses of the job in jurisdictions outside of Michigan. What is surprising is
that a case under the Federal Employees Liability Act has held on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action that a plaintiff states a cause of
action when he alleges that he incurred a mental disability due to the ordinary
stresses of his job. This is surprising because most text writers and cases state
that the aims of workmen's compensation and its lack of a jury trial allow
more liberality in establishing a causal relationship between the injury and the
employment situation. 37 The courts have felt that a board, guided by presumed
experts, would be able to see through false claims.
In McMillan v. Western Pacific Railroad Company, an FELA case, plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was employed by defendant as a train
36. Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
37. Guttmacher and Weihofen, supra note 13 at 52.
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dispatcher and that defendant, in the words of the complaint, "negligently and
carelessly required him to be subjected .. .to working conditions of unusual
responsibility, stress and tension in that he was required to operate a system of
central traffic control of defendant's railroad which system involved multitudinous and complex mechanical factors and mental decisions, extreme responsibility, constant but shifting attention, and numerous clerical functions which
.. .imposed an unusual stress and burden upon the plaintiff's physical and
nervous system, which caused plaintiff to suffer a severe nervous collapse which
rendered him sick, sore, lame and disabled. '38 The California court felt that
the FELA did not require an accident nor a bodily injury but merely an injury,
either mental or physical, which was caused by the employer's negligence.
It relied upon a 1949 United States Supreme Court case allowing compensation
39
for silicosis.
This case appears to be hard to reconcile with the theory of negligence to
which it ostensibly adheres. Negligence presupposes an opportunity in the tortfeasor to foresee the consequences of his act or the opportunity to foresee such
consequences assuming the tortfeasor uses reasonable diligence. 40 In the above
case it is difficult to asume that the employer could have foreseen that this
particular employee would have a mental collapse by merely being subjected
to the ordinary stresses of his job, even granting that these stresses were somewhat out of the ordinary. In order to make the negligence theory meaningful
one would have to consider it a part of the employer's duty of foreseeability to
know the psychological condition of his employees, and what stresses they could
be subjected to without mental collapse. But, then no one seriously considers
an action under FELA as strictly a negligence action. It is a compromise between a negligence action and a workmen's compensation scheme. This method
of handling railroad employees' injuries probably represents a political compromise the merits of which are outside the scope of this discussion. Suffice it
to say that a jury may not be the most competent agency to assess causal
relationship between a neurosis and the stresses of employment.
An analysis of the methods used to compensate claimants inflicted with a
neurosis arising out of his employment will be passed over. The specific problem is what type of monetary payout will be most conducive to the recovery
and rehabilitation of the neurotic. It is recognized by some that the desire to
obtain compensation is a secondary factor which contributes to the continued
38. 54 Cal. 2d 841, 357 P.2d 449 (1960).
39. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
40. The purpose of the law is to prevent or secure a man indemnity from harm at
the hands of his neighbours, . . . When a man foresees that harm will result from
his conduct, the principle which exonerates that harm will result from his conduct,
the principle which exonerates him from accident no longer applies, and he is
liable. But, as has been shown, he is bound to foresee whatever a prudent and intelligent man would have foreseen, and therefore he is liable for conduct from which
such a man would have foreseen that harm was liable to follow.
Holmes, The Common Law 146-7 (1881).
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existence of the neurosis or prolongs its cure. 41 The subject is very nebulous
and not enough is known about the effects of different modes of settlement to
propose any one specific mode of settlement as most conducive to rehabilitation.
In a discussion of rules laid down by the courts, the effect of which is to
deny recovery unless the case conforms to the rules, one should have recourse
to the reality at which the rules are aimed. If the rules do not appear meaningful in relation to that reality then they have lost contact with, to paraphrase
Holmes, "that lifeblood of the law, experience." Do the requirements laid
down by the courts in compensation cases involving mental disabilities have
meaning in relation to the psychological reality? Some courts allow compensation where there is a physical impact to the body of the claimant or physical
injuries develop and a neurosis results. Other courts will allow it where a single
psychological element or mixture of elements results in a neurosis. Still others
will allow compensation where the ordinary stresses of the job bring the claimant
to the point of a mental collapse. Do these distinctions have any correlative
categories in phsychiatry? Does the existence of an impact or single shocking
event make the resulting neurosis more connected with the employment situation
than ordinary stresses of the job resulting in a neurosis? Psychiatry would seem
to say no. In the words of one text writer, "there is frequently no correlation between the intensity of the trauma and the resultant neurosis. In fact, it is said
that the neurosis is more likely to occur when there has been no real physical
injury. Particularly severe traumatic reactions may follow accidents in which
2
someone else was killed or badly hurt and the patient himself escaped injury."'1
It is more likely that a particular occurrence at work merely serves as an
excuse for an inner conflict to attach to that occurrence unrelated to the objective intensity of that occurrence. This would seem to dispel the distinction
between a single mental shock and prolonged stress as to one being more related
to the job than the other. To quote from Freud again: "Supposing we do trace
back a typical symptom in a case of hysteria to an experience or to a chain of
similar experiences (for instance, an hysterical vomiting to a series of impressions of a disgusting nature), it will be confusing to discover in another case of
vomiting an entirely dissimilar series of apparently causative experiences. It
almost looks as though the historical factors revealed by analysis were but pretexts, seized upon by an inner necessity, when opportunity offered, to serve its
purpose." 43 Thus, it appears that the external nature of the experience, whether
it is a physical impact, an intensive mental shock, or horror does not have a
determinative effect upon the onset of a neurosis. The slightest incident may
be the cause of a complete mental collapse. If this is the true position of
psychiatry, then compensation should be granted if the work situation precipitates a neurosis and this is established by competent medical testimony. It
41.
Sullivan,
42.
43.

Hood v. Texas Indemnity Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W. 345 (1948); see also
Conceptions of Modem Psychiatry (1947).
Gultmacher and Weihofen, supra note 13 at 45.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
matters not that the claimant was predisposed to mental breakdown, for an
employer, under prevailing doctrine, must take the claimant as he finds him.
Is there not an element of arbitrariness in saddling the employer with the
cost of a neurosis precipitated by any trivial happening at the employment
situation? If the court's distinctions between impact and mental shock cases
are not meaningful, should some other limiting criteria be used besides the
precipitating event test? It does not seem unjust to place the burden of risk
on the employer even though the claimant's early experiences predisposed him
to a neurotic breakdown. Even in this era of increased lesiure, the individual's
life is still predominantly organized around his occupation. In the absence of
an all-pervasive scheme of social legislation covering medical care and disability
benefits for a disability no matter how incurred, the compensation system appears as the only available vehicle upon which to place much of the burden.
Most industries can pass the cost of such compensation on to the consumer.
Given the conservative temper of our present era, sweeping legislation setting
up a compensation scheme for everybody is out of the question. Without a
political solution of a comprehensive nature, it is not arbitrary or unjust to
place the burden of disabling neuroses upon the Workmen's Compensation
system if it is proved that the work situation precipitated it.

